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Abstract
Threadneedle is a multi-agent simulation framework, based on a double entry book keeping implementation
of the banking system’s fundamental transactions. It is designed to serve as an experimental test bed for eco-
nomic simulations that can explore the banking system’s inWuence on the macro-economy under varying as-
sumptions for its regulatory framework, mix of Vnancial instruments, and activities of borrowers and lenders.
Support is provided for Basel Capital and central bank reserve regulatory frameworks, inter-bank lending and
correct handling of loan defaults within the bank accounting framework.
In this paper we provide an overview of the design of Threadneedle, and the rational for the double entry book
keeping approach used in its implementation. We then provide evidence from a series of experiments using
the simulation that the macro-economic behaviour of the banking system is in some cases sensitive to double
entry book keeping ledger deVnitions, and in particular that loss provisions can be systemically aUecting. We
also show that credit and money expansion in Basel regulated systems is now dominated by the Basel capital
requirements, rather than the older central bank reserve requirements. This implies that bank proVtability is
now the main factor in providing new capital to support lending, meaning that lowering interest rates can act
to restrict loan supply, rather than increasing borrowing as currently believed. We also show that long term
liquidity Wows due to interest repayment act in favour of the bank making the loan, and do not provide any
long term throttling eUect on loan expansion and money expansion as has been claimed by Keynes and others.
Introduction
Modern banking systems sit at the centre of a complex network of interacting contractual and Vnancial rela-
tionships which together comprise the modern monetary system. Historically analysis of this system has pre-
sented considerable challenges, due to its complexity, its nature as an emergent system being modiVed over
time, and also in no small part to its intrinsic operational dynamics, which rely on a mixture of statistical mul-
tiplexing and recursive feedback controls.
In this paper we present a simulation framework, Threadneedle, which is designed to allow researchers to ex-
plore the behaviour of fractional reserve based banking systems and their surrounding Vnancial frameworks
under varying assumptions about their regulatory frameworks, Vnancial instruments, and patterns of borrow-
ing and lending behaviours. Unlike other economic models which are based on mathematical interpretations of
the economy, or balance sheet views, Threadneedle is based on the same double entry booking, credit and debit
operations, which are used by the banking system’s accounting processes.
We believe this approach oUers a number of advantages. It is reproducible. Banking transactions are discrete,
regulatory frameworks are deVned sets of rules, and the resulting system is computable. Given a set of double
entry book keeping operations, and an accompanying regulatory framework, any computer simulation should
be capable of reproducing the results of these operations with matching results.1 In principle such simulations
can also be subjected to a standard accounting audit for veriVcation. It is concrete, and falsiVable. By basing
the simulation on double entry book keeping practices we ensure that we are reproducing the banking system
1Subject to known limits on decidability within distributed systems[1]
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at its most fundamental level. Questions about these practices can be referred back to their actual implementa-
tion in the banking system, and if there are diUerences between national accounting systems, or between indi-
vidual institutions, these can be incorporated into the simulation, and a determination made as to whether they
are simulation, and by implication, economically aUecting. It is scientiVc. Experiments can be performed on a
replica of the actual system, and causal relationships (or their absence) determined; for example comparisons
between diUerent forms of lending within the otherwise identical banking systems.
In the rest of this paper we will discuss some of the design considerations involved in banking system simula-
tion, and present results from experiments performed on simple two bank systems. Owing to some of the con-
fusion that surrounds banking operations in the literature, we will start with a brief overview of the standard
textbook description of banking, and discuss some of its errors. We will then present some preliminary results
from simulations which examine the impact of interest rate changes in a Basel regulatory framework, partic-
ularly with respect to liquidity Wows between banks. Finally we will examine the signiVcance of these results
for economic treatment of the banking system, in particular the banking system’s sensitivity to changes in the
regulatory framework, and the implications this has for macro-economic models of the monetary system.
1 Background
Economics theories speciVc to the banking system typically rest in an uneasy intersection between mathemat-
ical models based on formulations derived from observational data that ignore any peculiar or unique role
banking may play within the economy, and the empirical reality of periodic banking system instabilities, sig-
niVcant disruption to the economy and over a century of speculation about their precise causes. Economic
analysis of the Vnancial system typically relies on a set of assumptions about the behaviour of the banking
system which were developed during the 1930’s. Following a remarkably periodic set of banking crises dur-
ing the 19th century, regulatory controls developed by the British Empire after the panic of 1873 introduced a
period of seeming stability (Laidler 2003[2]), at least within the British monetary system. The British Monetary
Orthodoxy as Fetter[3] later described it consequently became a template for the regulation of banking sys-
tems world wide; it was also embedded in a set of simplifying assumptions for economic theories that depicted
banking as a stable, controlled and uniform system, under the watchful regulatory eye of a national central
bank, informed on how to conduct its operations by economic theory.
Consequently the banking system came to be regarded as a victim of Vnancial shocks, rather than their cause.
Bernanke in 1999[4] for example, describes it as acting simply as an accelerator of endogenous developments
in credit markets. As such the banking system required no special analysis, and could be abstracted as a simple
supplier of credit. There was no perceived need to examine the possibility that it could be the direct cause of
economic shocks, nor to consider the idea that bank credit carried side eUects that distinguished it from other
forms of lending.
This question of whether banking is the victim of Vnancial shocks, their instigator, or possibly both, is a crit-
ical one for economic theory. Treating the banking system as a benign black box, simply supplying credit to
the economy considerably simpliVes the problem of analyzing an already complex system. For this to be the
case though, the behaviour of the system must at a minimum be linear and predictable. If non-linear and dy-
namic processes can be attributed to the banking mechanisms then we must at least cast this assumption as
non-proven. Since the banking system relies on statistical multiplexing techniques, and uses recursive mech-
anisms for control that embody positive and negative feedback mechanisms, some potential for intrinsic dy-
namism certainly exists.
Since the credit crisis of 2007 the problems with the assumption of banking system stability have been con-
siderably discussed, especially with respect to current macro-economic models. Proposals to resolve it such as
Borio[5] typically revolve around attempts to simplistically add high level observational theories to existing
economic models, rather than re-examining the foundations of the models themselves. These economic mod-
els rarely present a coherent regulatory framework, and on examination are often a mixture of assumptions
from older work on gold standard/reserve based systems and the post-Bretton Woods, Basel Accord capital
based systems. Monetary expansion is often attributed purely to government money printing (seignorage) e.g.
Krugman 1998[6]), without considering the role of changing reserve requirements, and their eUective removal
in many countries. No distinction is made between diUerent types of debt within the economy, even though
debt created by the banking system is accompanied by side eUects on the liability deposit money supply. A
commonly expressed view, in this case by Krugman[7] is that "the overall level of debt makes no diUerence
to aggregate net worth – one person’s liability is another person’s asset", and that it is simply the distribution
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of debt that matters (Krugman 2012[7]). This balance sheet view ignores issues not only with the amount of
money required to pay any given quantity of debt, but its distribution to allow debt to be paid. Clearly Krug-
man’s statement cannot be true for completely arbitrary quantities of debt, as in the limit there would be in-
suXcient money across the economy available to meet monthly principal and interest repayments. Only the
mechanisms of fractional reserve banking guarantee matching amounts of money against debt being created.
Other sources of debt such as government and corporate borrowing and loan securitization add to the quantity
of debt in the economy without increasing the money supply.[8]
Perhaps most critically though, even though specialists in banking such as Borio[9] acknowledge the many
defects in economic descriptions of the banking system’s operations; it has become almost impossible to de-
termine from the many claims and counter-claims being made about the system’s behaviour, which is actually
correct, since few attempt are made to root these claims in statements or descriptions that can be proved or
disproved by reference to concrete operations derived from the banking system’s book keeping operations.
Computer simulation, while widely used in other Velds, has been relatively under utilized in monetary eco-
nomics. The Sante Fe Stock Market Simulation is perhaps one of the best known market simulations, but it
concentrated purely on market and trading dynamics, and did not include any larger economic context such as
borrowing and money supply issues[10]. Lehtinen[11] presents an interesting argument which suggests that
this oversight is a consequence of economic thought typically proceeding from top down approaches based on
mathematical models of theories of equilibrium, rather than following the bottom up approach of construct-
ing as realistic as possible a simulacrum of the object under study as more typically used in other Velds.2 This
appears to be true even with the more recent agent based models. Examination of their source code shows eco-
nomic theories such as the Cobb-Douglas production function being incorporated directly into these models
and the advice to use careful "calibration" of their parameters to achieve desired results. Bianchi’s[14] descrip-
tion of the CATS model provides a typical example of these problems.
An alternate explanation for why simulation of the banking system in particular has not been previously at-
tempted, even though simulations of market trading have, may simply be the absence of reliable literature in
this area. Our Vrst attempts to build a banking system simulation (see Mallett 2011) [15] relied on the text-
book description of the banking system found in standard economic textbooks such as Mankiw[16] Burda and
Wyplozs[17]. The result of this work was to demonstrate that the textbook description could not in fact be im-
plemented as shown, and our conclusion was that this description could not be taken as a reliable model of the
banking system’s behaviour.
The description itself appears to originate from an explanation of the deposit expansion process provided in
the 1931 Macmillan report to the British Parliament[18] shown here in table 1, which is believed to have been
authored by Keynes. The particularly problematic aspect of the modern description seems to arise from a copy
and paste error between Keynes’ original description, where he restricted his example very speciVcally to "oc-
curring in a single bank", and an expanded example where loans are shown being made between a series of
banks, originating from one bank and being made to a customer at the next bank in the series. This example
breaks down immediately loan repayments are applied. Banks are left with insuXcient liquidity to transfer
customer re-payments back up the chain after a couple of repayment cycles owing to the leverage created be-
tween reserves and deposits. We surmise that Keynes was aware of this issue, since he was careful of his word-
ing, but that subsequent authors apparently were not. It also follows though that this description cannot be
generalized as a description for banking systems that do not consist of a single bank.
There are other problems with the canonical description, which when considered in the context of double en-
try book keeping ledger deVnitions cannot be excused so lightly, as they appear to violate the fundamental ac-
counting equation1:
Assets = Liabilities+Capital (1)
We can deduce from Table 1 that the initial deposit must be a cash deposit since reserves are being shown as
withheld from it. Under double entry book keeping this would be deVned as an asset, a bank loan is also an as-
set as is the central bank reserve account (or a reserve of physical cash). The liability deposit that is in actuality
being created by the banking system when the loan is issued is not shown. Consequently even the original ex-
ample it seems, must at best be regarded as incomplete.
2For a recent discussion of the pitfalls of models in the Vnancial and monetary context see PWeiderer[12], Leijonhufvud[13], also pro-
vides an entertaining description of the anthropological role models play in the development of economic thought.
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Bank Amount Deposited Loans Reserves
A 100 90 10
B 90 81 9
C 81 72.9 8.1
D 72.9 65.6 7.29
etc.
Table 1: Textbook Description of Deposit Expansion with a 10% reserve requirement
While the inadequacies of this introductory description are being acknowledged, most recently by the Bank
of England[19], the task of replacing it has yet to be attempted. Documentation at this level of detail for the
banking system’s double entry book keeping practices is not easy to Vnd - the old manual processes that were
employed to maintain double entry book keeping ledgers and records were computerized in the 1960’s, and
are now relatively remote from day to day practices. A number of detailed descriptions of 19th century book
keeping practices speciVcally written for banks do exist: Alexander Shand’s Ginko Bohi Seiho[20] provides a
description of the seven fundamental operations of banking and was used by the Japanese Empire to convert
their Vnancial system entirely to double entry book keeping shortly after the Meiji Restoration. Meelboom[21]
describes both the ledger and the organizational practices and procedures of what was at that time an entirely
manual operation in considerable detail for an American bank, but does so shortly before the founding of the
Federal Reserve and so does not include the operations of the central bank.
While more recent information can be found on isolated operations, we were unable to Vnd any modern docu-
mentation suitable for our purpose. Mecimore’s Bank Controller’s Manual from 2005[22] for example, contains
detailed treatment of US regulations and account treatment but stops just above the double entry book keeping
level of accounts.
To address this issue, we have created a detailed description of the fundamental bank book keeping operations
which are used by the framework, modelled on Shand’s approach. This has been reviewed by subject matter
experts in bank accounting, and is available on line[23] at the arxiv.org repository for reference. Worked ex-
amples for each double entry book keeping operation supported by the simulation framework are provided
in order to ensure that our understanding of these operations is correct. While every eUort has been made to
validate the operations described, the design of the simulation framework also allows any errors to be easily
corrected.
2 Design Considerations
Threadneedle presents the banking system from a ledger perspective, directly matching the underlying books
used for double entry book keeping operations. From this perspective, Wows within the banking system origi-
nate from transfers between accounts, always performed as two simultaneous operations on separate ledgers.
For example, Figure 1 shows a high level ledger view of two banks, and the monetary Wows that accompany
repayment of interest on a bank loan both within and between them.3
3In this paper we simplify bank operations to a single ledger representing one bank. In practice banks normally operate as a collection
of branches, each of which maintains its own general ledger, and inter-branch operations are required to move funds between branches
in similar ways to the movement of funds between banks. The impact and variability of such operations is currently an open research
question, (See Gudjonsson 2014[24]).
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Figure 1: Flows within the Banking System
All operations on bank ledgers are performed using double entry book keeping operations, each of which con-
sists of a (credit, debit) tuple, which must be applied to two separate ledgers simultaneously. One of the conse-
quences of this arrangement is that it eUectively creates two separate forms of money, asset cash deposited at
a bank, and liability deposit accounts, which can be created either by cash deposits, but also by bank lending.
Transfers between monetary accounts can only be done on a like for like basis. It is possible to transfer directly
between two liability accounts at the same bank, and it is possible to transfer between two asset cash accounts,
by removing money from one, and re-depositing it at the other, but it is not possible to transfer from a liability
deposit account to an asset cash account in a single operation. The two forms of money are maintained com-
pletely separately by the underlying operations.
Threadneedle is structured around this ledger view of the banking system, with banks that individually imple-
ment the necessary double entry book keeping operations on a transactional basis. Loans for example are sim-
ulated as a transaction that initially credits the borrower’s deposit account, and debits the asset loan account,
and then a sequence of debits to the loan’s capital and credits to the bank’s interest income account from the
borrower’s deposit account for each payment period of the loan. Within the simulation agents with distinct
behaviours required by the banking system, such as capital purchase, are provided and these also provide tem-
plates that can be extended to build more sophisticated agents as required. All communication between agents
is performed via monetary transactions, that is the agents only respond to the information provided by mon-
etary Wow within the simulation and implicit information derived from it such as interest rates and prices. A
government agent is responsible for setting the base interest rate through the central bank, government bor-
rowing and taxation. These details can also be controlled by conVguration, and changed during the simulation.
The framework also provides support for the purchase and sale of arbitrary items directly between agents, or
through market mechanisms.
In order to create an environment where the results of diUerent regulatory frameworks on the limits of the
money and loan creation processes inherent within banking can be studied in isolation, the framework pro-
vides support for the banking system to be exercised independently of a full economy. The eventual goal of the
project though is to allow large scale simulation of all monetary transactions in a market based economy in-
cluding an accurate representation of the banking system, and features have been built into the framework to
support this eventual goal as well as the immediate requirements of banking system simulation.
All agents in the simulation can be provided with individual behaviours. This includes organizations such as
countries and regions, which can support diUerent tax regimes, and can also provide structural associations
between agents. The simulation currently supports a single country, currency, and associated central bank,
but multiple regions can be deVned within a country. Agents can be restricted to only operate within a sin-
gle region - allowing geographical structure to be explored. Relationships can also exist between agents, for
example companies can employ agents, and in doing so provide income. Inheritance is used widely, so that het-
erogeneous classes of agents can also be developed, with similar functions but diUerent behaviours within the
simulation where this cannot be adequately provided by conVguration parameters.
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Two base classes of bank are currently supported: one is a non-lending bank which functions purely as a de-
posit holder, and does not perform fractional reserve lending. This is provided for testing purposes and also
allows experiments with constant money economies to be performed. The other supported bank provides an
implementation of the Basel regulatory framework, with lending controlled by a risk based weighting of its
loan book, and central bank reserve requirement. Both of these can be conVgured to a range of values, or dis-
abled. Borrowers can be conVgured to request Vxed period, Vxed rate compound, simple interest or Icelandic
indexed linked loans as required. Banks in the simulation currently operate with a single general ledger, as
branch banking operations are not included.
2.1 Cash Handling
Since all double entry transactions consist of a (debit, credit) tuple, the simulation must provide a matching
asset debit, or liability at the central bank if the deposit is within the clearing system. While the (asset cash,
liability deposit) pairing is straightforward, handling for other accounts such as capital is less clear. Table 2
shows the pairings used for simulations in this paper. For commercial banks cash from investors or depositors
is initially placed in an asset cash account, and then transferred to the reserve account as required to meet reg-
ulatory requirements.
Asset Liability
Commercial Bank Cash Deposit
Cash Capital
Central Bank Cash Reserve account
Cash Deposit Account (Govern-
ment)
Table 2: Asset/Liability Double Entry Ledger Pairings used in Initialization
There are other ways to start a bank, the method chosen above is derived from examination of the Basel Frame-
work and its requirement for bank capital as a regulatory factor, rather than those used by earlier systems.
Miner’s 1902 manual on bank book keeping[25] for example, shows an alternate possibility where US Bonds
are purchased as an asset in order to obtain circulating notes. This example predates the establishment of cen-
tral banking in the USA, and also requires that government debt already exists. This is not the case when the
simulation is being initialized since it introduces a circular dependency: for government debt to exist, the gov-
ernment must be able to borrow money from existing deposits in the system.
2.2 Expansion from Initial Conditions
The initial expansion of the system poses a particular problem for simulation, since our goal is to determin-
istically explore the behaviour of a mature banking system from a known set of initial conditions. Owing to
the co-dependent relationship between loans and deposits in the system, we view it as impractical to try and
attempt to start the system in its mature stage, absent detailed knowledge of the loan book of banks in the sys-
tem.4
We can gain some insights into the underlying process if we examine what happens in the United States bank-
ing system system when a new bank is established.5 The owners of the bank are required to provide capital in
the form of an initial deposit of cash (asset) money, for which they receive shares (a liability) in the bank. In
addition separate cash deposits are also required which will provide additional asset cash reserves. Presumably
transfers from deposit accounts at other banks will also serve. As lending then takes place, the bank’s liability
deposits expand over time to the maximum permitted by whichever regulatory framework it is operating un-
der, subject to its interactions with its borrowers, depositors and other banks. The federal reserve expects the
bank to take three years to establish itself, and working capital has to be available for that period. Further ex-
pansion of its loan book beyond its initial capital in a Basel regulated regime then requires the bank to increase
its capital holdings, and possibly its central bank reserve holdings.
4The design of the system does not preclude this possibility should access to this level of information become possible.
5The Federal Reserve provides a detailed overview of the process for minority-owned institutions at its partnership for progress
sitehttp://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/start-a-bank/index.cfm
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2.3 Designing Banking Simulations
The design of individual simulations begins with creating banks and populating them with a mixture of bor-
rowers, savers and investors. Investors buy capital (preferential shares) from the bank in exchange for a cash
deposit, Borrowers are programmed to request a loan each round until one is granted, and then to repay it
if they have funds to do so. Once they have repaid a loan completely they will then attempt to borrow again.
Borrowers can also be given a cash amount to deposit, and receive a matching deposit in their account if they
do so. Savers deposit cash, and receive a matching deposit in return. They can be used to provide asset liquid-
ity without additional side eUects as desired.
Banks cannot however be so populated ad hoc. In a fractional reserve banking system lending creates a match-
ing liability deposit, leading to the well known expansion of the money supply (as denominated in liability de-
posits). This initial expansion can distort the subsequent behaviour of the simulation, depending on how it is
distributed and the regulatory framework being applied.
If we take a slightly pathological case as an example. In a strict reserve regulated simulation, if the bank allows
a single borrower to borrow the maximum amount allowed, then the entire loan book will consist of a single
loan. Until this loan has been suXciently repaid to free up the necessary loan capacity, no new loans can be
made, and the money supply will be seen to contract. Figure 2 shows a single bank simulation, with borrow-
ers conVgured to request 120 step loans of 200,000. Cyclic behaviour of this nature is typical of simulations of
strictly reserve regulated systems with insuXcient or poorly distributed lending patterns, owing to the feed-
back in the regulatory control between lending limits and deposits.
Figure 2: Unevenly distributed lending in a strictly reserve regulated system
Since we can deduce from modern national monetary statistics that fractional banking systems are typically in
a state of continuous expansion, and as far as we are aware no banking system has ever been regulated solely
on an absolutely Vxed reserve of cash holdings, we can reasonably attribute this as a simulation artifact.
In order to force borrowing to be more evenly distributed, borrowers can be assigned a loan window which
restricts the steps in which they can request loans. This in conjunction with appropriately sized loans allows
more realistic simulations to be created.
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Additional considerations surround asset cash availability. In a reserve regulated system suXcient asset cash
must be present in proportion to the size of the loans being made. In both capital and reserve systems there
must also be suXcient cash to meet any liquidity requirements arising from inter-bank transfers. In a capital
regulated system suXcient capital must be present, again in proportion to the size of loans being requested. To
create an even loan distribution which maximize lending, and its associated deposit creation over time, against
the regulatory framework in operation, the following guidelines are suggested for simulations designed to sat-
urate the banking system’s loan capacity.
Loan Window = L
No. of Borrowers >= 5 ∗L
Asset Cash>= L∗D∗R
>=Capital ∗C
where:
L= Loan period in steps
D= Average loan amount
R= Central Bank Reserve requirement as a percentage.
C= Capital Reserve requirement as a percentage.
Under these guidelines with each borrower only taking one loan at a time, for 10 year loans (120 steps) of
10,000 monetary units each, a minimum conVguration for a 10% reserve requirement system would be 600 bor-
rowers. Borrowers should also receive a minimum deposit that allows them to make their Vrst loan repayment.
Capital purchases act to provide the capital requirement, so simulations testing Basel banking systems will in
practice need to distribute the initial cash created for the system across investors and borrowers. Savers can
be used to provide cash deposits without any further interaction with the banking system if desired, since the
base base saver class does not receive interest on their account. It is expected that the saver class will be ex-
tended to allow interest bearing accounts, but this creates accompanying Wow considerations as discussed be-
low.
2.4 Flow Considerations in Simulation
Simulations only run continuously as long as their monetary Wows can be satisVed. Debtors for example, must
receive some form of income source so that they can meet the repayments on their loans, adequate loss provi-
sions must be available against which loans that default can be written oU. For example, if treasuries are used
in the simulation, but the government has no form of revenue, such as taxes, the simulation will quickly halt as
monetary Wow breaks down due to the government having no income to meet interest and capital payments on
its treasuries. In simulations where Wow breaks down the cause may lie in economic fundamentals which re-
Wect the actual behaviour of the monetary system, or in artifacts of the simulation’s design, and neither source
should be ignored when exploring the reasons for this phenomena.
For simulations that isolate the banking system - such as the ones in this paper - it is necessary to provide a
Wow of money to a bank’s borrowers in order that they can meet their loan obligations. To achieve this bor-
rowers can be conVgured to be employed by a bank which then uses its interest income to pay them an amount
that allows them to meet their capital and interest repayments for that round. Provided that the bank has suf-
Vcient interest income to meet its borrower’s requirements, this provides a continuous Wow of money between
borrowers and banks which can be used to satisfy the constraints being set by the banks lending behaviour,
and exercise the regulatory framework.
To set this within an economic context, Figure 3 shows an abbreviated example of the Wow of money within a
single bank, which results from interest payments on loans made by the bank, with the assumption that recip-
ients of non-interest expense payments maintain their deposit account at the same bank as the account orig-
inating the interest payment. Payment of interest on bank loans when the depositor’s account is at the same
bank as that making the loan is simply:
(debit customer account, credit bank’s interest income account)
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since both accounts are classed as liabilities. When an interest (or capital) payment is made from an account
that is not at the same bank, a more complex sequence of operations occurs, speciVcally:
@ Originating Bank: (credit cash, debit customer account)
@ Receiving Bank: (debit cash, credit bank’s interest income ac-
count)
with the accompanying asset transfers occurring either through central bank accounts, or dedicated clearing
mechanisms. The availability of asset forms of money to support interbank operations is consequently a crit-
ical aspect of banking operations, but not necessarily an economic one, leading to the critical distinction in
banking interventions between insolvency and illiquidity.
Typically a bank will receive interest payments into its interest income account, from which expenses such as
loan defaults must be deducted before it can be recognized as income and paid out as more general expenses
such as employee salaries, dividend payments to shareholders, and purchases of additional capital. A stochastic
loan default rate can also be applied, and this can be used to create simulations where the sensitivity of the
system to default risk can be explored.
Within the larger economy, a series of payments can consequently be envisioned between the recipient of the
expense payment by the bank, and the ultimate debtor who makes the interest payment on their loan. In the
simulations presented here we eUectively short circuit this series to a direct relationship between a borrower
and a bank, although not necessarily the same bank as the loan is made from. Only in the case that the bank
has insuXcient income to make payments will borrowers in the simulation be unable to pay their loans. Con-
Vguring borrowers to receive salaries from a diUerent bank to which they are borrowing from allows the in-
terbank transfer mechanisms to be exercised, and can also be used to create deliberately unbalanced interbank
Wows in order to explore the eUects of interest changes on the interbank lending mechanisms under controlled
conditions, as we will see below.
Assets Liabilities
Customer Loans
Cash & Equivalents
Reserve @ Central Bank
Customer Deposits
Interest Income (Bank) 
Capital
2) Recognised Income
1) Interest Payment 
to Bank
3) Payment to deposit account
(Non-interest Expense)
Figure 3: Bank’s Interest income Wow through its Ledgers
This is clearly an artiVcial arrangement, but it is designed to allow the banking mechanisms to be exercised in-
dependently of the larger economy. It also creates a best case for the banking system, since all interest income
received by the bank will be looped into loan repayments as necessary. If regulatory mechanisms are unstable
under this arrangement, then we can justiVably point to the mechanisms as a cause of problems rather than the
nebulously deVned catch all of human economic behaviour.
2.5 Central Banking
The Central Bank side of the system is becoming increasingly complex, especially with the fallout from correc-
tive measures taken during the 2007 credit crisis. For example, the Federal Reserve’s 2011 Annual Report shows
the majority of its assets as a mixture of government treasuries and mortgage backed securities, the latter hav-
ing been acquired through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).6. The rather less detailed balance sheet
6Federal Reserve Annual Report 2011, p327 http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/annual-report/files/2011-annual-report.pdf
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of the Bank of England simply lists ’Other loans and advances’ as the majority asset7 while the European Cen-
tral Bank has a mixture of gold, loans to Euro credit institutions, and securities comprising the majority of its
holdings8. It is not known to what extent these diUerences are systemically aUecting.
Central bank holdings of Vnancial instruments that provide income, for example treasuries, also create Wows
within the system that need to be balanced, which we assume was at least part of the reason for the Federal
Reserve to initiate interest payments on reserve holdings to its banks in the wake of the TARP program. Where
possible these issues have been delegated to the user and the design of the simulation being constructed, with
the framework providing as simple an initialization state as practical. For the time being, the central bank’s
holdings have been simpliVed to cash. For the speciVc simulations discussed in this paper we have adopted the
convention shown in Table 2 where the central bank initially holds a cash asset against its liability (reserve)
accounts, and does not have a capital account. Since the main activity of the central bank in the simulation is
to support the clearing system through transfers between banks using their reserve accounts, we do not believe
this to be systemically aUecting for the purpose of these simulations. The government’s bank deposit is also
held at the central bank, which appears to be the usual case for the banking systems we have examined. This
it should be noted, may be systemically eUecting as it then interacts with the central bank’s balance sheet, and
is a topic that deserves more investigation. Detailed exploration of the issues on the central bank side of the
system is a subject for future research.
2.6 Implementation
The framework is written in Java, and can be run on Windows, Linux or MacOS. All monetary transactions
within the framework are performed using full double entry book keeping and a records of all transactions
are available through the simulation, and can be audited as required. The asset, liability and capital classiVca-
tion of individual bank ledgers is conVgurable, which allows experiments to be performed with diUerent ledger
classiVcations if required. A set of base objects such as the Borrower class described above are included, which
provide support for simple simulations, and can be extended by users with programming experience to provide
customized behaviours as required. The framework currently provides the following:
Class Description
Govt Base class for governments. Flat rate tax, and government treasuries.
Bank Provides a non-fractional reserve deposit holding bank which does not perform
lending
BaselBank Provides a bank implementing Basel Regulation which can be enabled or disabled
as required.
Investor Buys bank shares (capital) and receives interest.
Borrower Borrows from a bank and receives salary. Can take out a loan.
Saver Bank deposit holder. Can be used to simply provide deposit money without side
eUects
Loan Fixed term, compound interest rate loan
Simple Fixed term, simple interest rate loan
IndexedLoan Icelandic Indexed linked loan
Table 3: Economic actors currently provided by framework.
2.7 ConVguration
Simulations can be deVned using a drag and drop interface, or from a JSON formatted text conVguration Vle.
Data from simulations is displayed on graphs during runtime and can also be exported for separate analysis.
The framework provides a command line interface through which parameters can be examined and changed
during the simulation, and a batch mode. Batch mode also supports a simple programmable interface that al-
lows simulation parameters to be modiVed between runs. Although only single country simulations are sup-
ported at present, countries are speciVed in the conVguration in order to allow eventual support for larger in-
ternational simulations, either of countries with diUerent currencies, or multi-national currency unions.
7Bank of England Annual Report 2011, p50, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/annualreport/2011/2011full.pdf
8European Central Bank, Annual Report 2011 p200
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3 Results
In this section we present the results from a set of simple experimental simulations, designed to explore some
of the questions surrounding the banking system’s response to diUerent forms of regulatory control and macro-
economic intervention such as interest rates. In these simpliVed prototypical banking systems, interest rates
are set for the entire system, with no diUerence between the interbank lending rate and the rate for customer
loans. Fixed rate loans are used, where the interest rate applies for the entire period of the loan, i.e. the aUects
of interest rate changes only take eUect when new loans are issued. Long period Vxed rate loans are typical of
US bank lending, but not generally for European banking systems. We would stress that we are interested in
this paper in the mechanical response of the banking system at its limits to changes, rather than the results of
these responses on the economy. Ten year (120 repayment periods) loans are used in these examples for illus-
trative purposes.
3.1 Central Bank Reserve Regulation
Figure 4 shows a simple central bank reserve regulated banking system with two banks. Each bank has 600
borrowers requesting loans of 10,000 each, 10 year duration, with a base rate that is initially 2%.9 The system’s
loan supply is saturated, as can be seen from the highlighted reserve constraint (show in red), and after some
perturbation as a result from the expansion from initial conditions (see above) the money supply is stable. All
lending is conVned to depositors at the loan originating bank, so there is no interbank activity. Reserve regu-
lation in this simulation is based on the textbook calculation of the diUerence between reserves and customer
deposits:
Loan Limit = ∑reserve ledger/R−∑deposit ledger (2)
where R is the central bank reserve percentage, in this case 10% providing a theoretical (liability) money mul-
tiplier of 10. Capital controls are not enabled. New loans are granted when the bank’s loan capacity is greater
than the capital value of the loan. As a consequence there is some variation of the rate of lending over time as
shown in the graph of new bank lending. With reference to the reservations previously noted, this simulation
is as close as it is possible to come to the standard textbook description of the banking system. In this simu-
lation, the central bank base rate begins at 2%, is increased to 5% at step 240, and returned to 2% again at step
480, resulting in the credit supply behaviour shown
Figure 4: Reserve controlled lending with changing base interest rates over time.
9Simulation conVguration Vle reference: eea_Vg4.json
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The simulation’s calculation of the reserve limit is based solely on the deposit ledger, and this in turn is ef-
fected both by the size of ledgers derived from deposit accounts: loss provisions and interest income. Conse-
quently the actual amount of lending varies directly with interest rates, since increases in interest rates in this
simulation cause an increase in the size of the interest income ledger which is not counted as a deposit. This
behaviour in the simulation is somewhat artiVcial since typically a bank’s interest income is not directly cou-
pled to interest rates, as changes also occur to the amount of income being paid out to savers as an expense.
However, it does demonstrate the sensitivity within reserve constrained banking system to ledger classiVca-
tions, since this eUect will also apply to changes in loss provisions. Potentially similar eUects could occur in
reserve based systems due to banks reserving against foreseen losses or periodic dividend payments.
Today banks are required to make loss provisions at the time the loan is made.10 The amounts held are par-
tially regulated and partially under each individual bank’s control. Until the mid-1970’s in the USA for exam-
ple, favourable tax law resulted in higher loss provisions, which were then reduced when the law was changed.
This experiment demonstrates that changes to loss provision requirements in conjunction with reserve regu-
lation can potentially alter credit provision, depending on how they are classiVed within the system and the
regulatory framework. According to Balla[26] they are accounted as a contra-asset on the balance sheet, but
since they are deducted from expenses on the income statement, in practice they originate from liability de-
posits. Frait[27] and others have suggested that loss provisioning may be pro-cyclical within a Basel frame-
work however it follows from this result that this question cannot be answered simply by looking at levels of
loss provisioning, since the regulatory framework also plays interacts with the system’s response to these lev-
els.
This can be seen in Figure 5 which in contrast shows the identical simulation with capital controls enabled, and
reserve controls disabled. The capital control is a 50% Basel risk weighting calculation applied to all loans. In
this experiment we see no change in lending as a result of the interest rate changes, since lending is regulated
by capital holdings, and loss provisions are being treated as a liability. Instead, the money supply decreases
as a result of the increase in interest income. This is, as discussed above, a simulation artifact, the sum of the
deposit and interest income ledgers is unchanged. It does show that the main result of interest rate changes
in a Basel regulated system - leaving aside aUects on loan demand - is to modify the distribution of monetary
Wows between savers and debtors.
Figure 5: Capital controlled lending with changing base interest rates over time.
Treated as a liability, loss provisions do not directly interact with Basel regulation of the loan supply, unless by
reducing proVts, they prevent the bank from expanding its capital base. However, some loss provisions can be
included in Tier 2 capital and this does have the potential to interact with loan regulation.
10Full book keeping for loss provisions involves a contra-asset loss reserve account, the version shown here is somewhat simpliVed.
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Also of interest is the counter-intuitive response under reserve regulation to the increase in interest rates, with
higher interest rates leading to an increase in lending under. This is again due to ledger classiVcation, and the
associated increase in interest income with higher interest rates, since the liability money in that ledger is then
not counted toward the central bank reserve requirement. The simulation’s mechanics represent the maximum
possible size of the response: the actual size of the eUect would be dependent on how much and how long in-
terest income was retained within the banking system before being recognized. The possibility of individual
banks manipulating this dependency would also appear to exist.
Although reserve regulation is successful in this set of artiVcial circumstances, this should not be taken as in-
dicative of its actual eUectiveness. This experiment did not include inter-bank lending, and it has been known
since the 1920’s that the regulatory role of central bank reserves could be partially circumvented by both in-
terbank lending and re-discounting. Keynes discusses this as one of the results of divergent practices between
the US Federal Reserve Banks and the Bank of England in 1929[28]. It is hard to know the full impact of these
problems on the banking systems of their time, without a complete description of their regulatory framework,
including their capital relationships, and ledger classiVcations.11
The most signiVcant result from these simulations is the evidence that the banking system and by extension,
the macro-economy within which it is operating, can be aUected by accounting deVnitions operating at the
lowest levels of its implementation. This not only indicates a system that has a considerably greater degree
of sensitivity to the minutiae of its regulatory and accounting frameworks than may have previously been as-
sumed, but also suggests that national macro-economic variations may be in part due to seemingly inconse-
quential diUerences in bank regulation.
3.2 The eUects of lending on bank asset liquidity
Modern banking systems vary considerably in their use of central bank reserve requirements, and have gen-
erally moved away from using them in a regulatory role. No banking system appears to apply them to bank
deposits in their entirety: at one extreme the Bank of England has no formal reserve requirements but has in-
troduced liquidity requirements which are similar if not identical in their eUects. The Euro banking system ap-
plies a 2% reserve requirement to all deposit accounts, excepting time deposits of greater than 2 years duration,
and while the US applies a 10% reserve requirement to net transaction accounts, in practice there is consider-
able scope for account reclassiVcation which allows its banks signiVcant latitude over the size of their reserve
accounts. Highly liquid forms of debt instrument such as treasuries can also be used to meet some of this re-
quirement.
The expansion from initial conditions show in all simulations here demonstrates that in the absence of some
form of regulation the banking system will rapidly expand its lending and the associated liability money sup-
ply. If most modern banking systems do not have strict reserve requirements, then what, besides borrower de-
mand, is limiting the expansion of modern banking systems?
A claim made in the Macmillan Report, economic textbooks, and repeated recently by McLeay et. al.[19]12 is
that liquidity considerations play a role in throttling lending and money expansion. SpeciVcally because funds
being lent will be wholly or partly transferred to other banks in the banking system, the bank must restrict its
lending to prevent it losing asset money. In the period of the Macmillan report of course such an aUect would
have interacted directly with the formal reserve requirements applied at the time, acting as an immediate re-
striction on further lending.
This argument however overlooks the long term Wows of money associated with loan repayment, and in par-
ticular interest payments. The total amount of money transferred to the loan originating bank just as interest
repayment on a 25 year loan at 6.5% is approximately equal to the original capital. Banks originating loans can
consequently expect a net inWow of asset money over time, even if there is a short term outWow at the time
the loan is made. The long term and dominating eUect on liquidity is consequently the exact opposite to that
claimed by Keynes et. al.
Figure 6 shows the same simulation used in the previous two experiments, with a single addition, a borrower
with an account at Bank 1, receiving salary payments from Bank 1, but taking out a loan of 10,000 (2˜% of the
bank’s total loan book) from Bank 2. As shown over time, there is a steady transfer of reserves from Bank 1 to
Bank 2, as interest and capital repayments are made on the loan.
11Under the 1844 Banking Act, London Banks were required to publish their holdings weekly. They developed the practice of doing this
on diUerent days of the week, which allowed inter-bank lending to be used to mask reserve discrepancies if necessary.
12Section(i) Limits on how much banks can lend p5
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Figure 6: Liquidity eUects of loan related asset Wows.
The size of this transfer is directly proportional to the interest rate on the loan, so as interest rates increase, the
accrual of assets at the originating bank will also increase. This mechanism points to an explanation for the
observed eUect reported by Ennis[29] for the USA, Benito[30] for the Spanish system, and Wilson[31] for the
four largest European systems, namely that banking systems tend to consolidate over long periods of time, i.e.
systems with large numbers of small banks progressively become systems with small numbers of large banks,
unless they are speciVcally regulated to prevent this. If we simply assume a randomly distributed number of
loans across the system being paid from non-originating banks, we can see that probabilistically large banks
will tend to cannibalize small banks of their asset money over time.
In practice, banks monitor their liquidity very carefully, and many require that their borrowers maintain ac-
counts at their bank, presumably in part because of the initial liquidity issues lending can cause. 13 However,
banks have little or no control over their customers activities over time. For example, a bank that deliberately
restricted lending to customers employed by a company that was also an account holder, would still not be able
to guard against customers who changed employers. Clearly a bank that was aware of this eUect could poten-
tially exploit it competitively, but the timescale for the strategy to be eUective would be several years.
Since increases in interest rates accelerate this mechanism, we hypothesize that it can be a cause of stress on
the interbank lending mechanisms, and that increasing interest rates would put additional pressure on banks
that were experiencing net asset outWows possibly leading to bank failure. The movement within the banking
system of interest and capital Wows due to securitized lending could also be expected to provide further stress
on liquidity provisions due to these factors. Clearly though, we must look elsewhere for restrictions on the
actual amount of lending being performed by the banking system.
Taken in conjunction with the result shown previously that interest rates do not directly aUect the credit sup-
ply of the system, this result also allows us to determine the Nyquist limit for the banking system. The Nyquist
limit is an important result from signal processing, which places a lower bound of twice the frequency under
study, for determining the minimum sampling period for a time based system which avoids the detection of
spurious signals due to aliasing.
Since there appears to be no impact on supply from interest rate changes, with the assumption that most bank-
ing systems are supply constrained, the main inWuence within the system on the money and credit supply
seem to stem from the creation and destruction of money within the system which occurs as loans are made
and repaid. This implies that the average loan period in conjunction with the regulatory limits on lending
dominates in determining the response of the system to its regulatory framework. With the majority of loans
in modern systems being of 20-30 year duration, this implies that macro-economic analysis based on monetary
13In Iceland, Arion Banki charges a higher interest rate to other banks’ customers, while the new MP Banki places no such restriction
on its lending.
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data must span a minimum of 40-60 years to avoid any spurious results due to aliasing. This is signiVcantly
longer than the mean time between signiVcant regulatory changes intended to alter the behaviour of the sys-
tem, suggesting that observational data may be of limited beneVt in assessing the long term economic conse-
quences of any given regulatory and accounting framework for this system.
3.3 Basel Capital Regulation
The introduction of the Basel Accords[32] from 1988 onwards imposed a new regulatory control on bank-
ing systems, one which attempted to regulate lending according to the default risk of particular categories
of loans.14 In contrast to the central bank reserve requirement which established a leveraged ratio between
money represented as liability deposits, to asset deposits of cash15; the Basel requirements establish a leveraged
ratio between a bank’s capital (a liability), and its loans (an asset) according to a risk weighted multiplier based
on the type of loan being made.
There is no indication that the Basel Accords were directly intended to limit monetary expansion, they were
explicitly designed to ensure that banks maintained suXcient capital to provide protection against insolvency
by ensuring that banks would have suXcient capital to handle loan defaults, in the event that their loss provi-
sions and proVts were inadequate for this purpose. There are no limits set on the total capital expansion by the
entire banking system for example: individual banks are simply responsible for obtaining suXcient capital to
cover their lending books with respect to the risk weighted lending requirements of their loan book.
This not withstanding, under simulation it is clear that the Basel capital requirements do exert at least a throt-
tle on lending and monetary expansion within the system, as shown in Figure 7. This simulation uses an iden-
tical conVguration to the previous examples with reserve controls disabled, and capital controls enabled. The
base interest rate is set to 5% in order to ensure that banks have suXcient interest income to pay dividends to
their investors. In contrast to the previous example where no increase in capital was allowed, Investors are
paid a dividend of 5% on their share holdings if suXcient income is available, and can use this to purchase new
capital every 12 steps. As a consequence the credit and money supplies expand, in this instance approximately
doubling over 10 years of simulation. This also suggests that the capital controls could be used for direct regu-
lation of money and credit expansion if desired, which may be worth of further investigation, since in conjunc-
tion with risk weighting it would also seem possible to inWuence sectoral lending.
Figure 7: Capital Reserve increases allowing Money and Credit expansion.
Part of the answer then, to what is regulating monetary expansion in modern banking systems, appears to be
the Basel capital requirement. While increases to the capital on which the requirement is calculated are not
explicitly limited, they are also not completely arbitrary. Increases to the capital reserve depend on a combi-
nation of each individual bank’s proVtability, their willingness to use their proVts to expand their capital base,
14See Alfriend[33] for a review of the shift in regulation toward capital controls from the 1940’s.
15Central bank reserves are an asset from the perspective of the bank which owns them, and a liability on the central bank side
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as opposed to salary, dividend and bonus payments etc., and any changes in regulatory levels on their capital
that have been imposed. One of the responses to the 2007 credit crisis for example was a regulatory require-
ment that banks increase their capital ratio by 2018, and this has probably had a contractionary eUect on some
economies over the last 5 years.
However, we do not rule out that in countries that still have reasonably comprehensive reserve requirements,
reserve regulation is not also playing a role. The history of the reserve requirement since the 1940’s is for a
progressive reduction, as computerized handling considerably reduced the time required for inter-bank pro-
cessing, and hence liquidity16 Reductions to the reserve requirement will allow credit and money supplies
to expand over time, up to the new limit. If this expansion is simultaneously throttled by the capital require-
ments, then the gradual arrival at the new limit may not be obvious for several years until after it has occurred.
4 Conclusion
Discrete event simulations have been widely used in engineering as a tool for both exploring and testing reg-
ulatory controls on complex system behaviour. While not all systems lend themselves to this approach, the
banking system is by its very nature a discrete event system, and we believe that this approach has consider-
able potential in analysing the response of banking systems to changes in the regulatory and Vnancial frame-
work.
Accounting rules are determined by accounting principals which are typically determined by a national stan-
dard boards and regulatory oversight bodies. Many countries are converging on the International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRS) established by the International Accounting Standards Board. These rules are primar-
ily designed to provide an accurate view of the business state of the individual companies that use them, rather
than the stability of the banking system within which they operate. Consequently the sensitivity to conditions
demonstrated in this paper of signiVcant concern, since it indicates that the banking system can be inWuenced
by features of accounting and book keeping practices that are in practical terms invisible to macro-economic
analysis.
Another matter deserving re-examination is the precise inWuence of interest rate changes on modern banking
systems. The idea that the system can be controlled through interest rate manipulations is based on theoretical
arguments originating from the early 20th century gold standard system as operated in Britain. There does not
however appear to be any concrete proof that this "control" operates in the way commonly claimed. Nor does
there appear to have been any attempt made to verify that it applies to banking systems besides those of the
early 20th century gold standard, if indeed it was applicable then. The results in this paper with respect to in-
terest rates suggest that these assumptions do not hold true for Basel regulated systems, and this is supported
by the experience in Iceland between 2005-2007 where an acceleration in lending led to a doubling of liability
deposits in the Icelandic banking system, despite the central bank raising the base interest rate to over 18% to
prevent it.
The illusion of control is a well known phenomena in psychology originating from work by Langer in 1975[34].
The dominant characteristics of banking systems: continuously varying rates of expansion in the credit and
money supply over long periods, periodic shocks, and interactions within a complex and dynamic economy,
in conjunction with what appears to be considerable sensitivity to relatively small changes provides an ideal
setting for this phenomena. Notable events will always be occurring in the economy somewhere, and without
recourse to a detailed analysis based on fundamental mechanisms, it is impossible to ascribe causal relation-
ships with any certainty. As a consequence, while economic theories and their mathematical models can Vnd a
source of supporting empirical evidence for theories applied to short time scales - longer periods present con-
siderably more challenge.
We can for example, use the evidence from the simulations presented here to suggest an alternative narrative
to that of the popular "zero-bound" hypothesis. If the inWuence of the banking system is linked to the period of
its loans, rather than short term interest rate changes, then the banking system’s behaviour must evolve over
decade long time scales, rather than months. In the absence of any direct inWuence of interest rates on lending
supply, and several indications that second order eUects are directly rather than inversely inWuenced by inter-
est rates, it would seem reasonable to conclude that increasing interest rates in a Basel regime may increase the
rate of money and credit expansion, rather than reducing it as generally believed.
16Except in China where attempts have been made to actively use the reserve requirement for regulation.
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We can consequently hypothesize that a long term process is occurring, where well intentioned policy inter-
ventions are having the opposite eUect to that desired. As liquidity issues periodically arise in the banking sys-
tem, either due to inevitably occurring imbalances caused by long term interest rate Wows, or by an excess of
lending in the larger economy, a higher loan default rate occurs than can be absorbed by the system on either
the asset or liability side of the balance sheet. Initially this manifests itself as a reduction in credit availability,
which then triggers a Fisher cascade failure[35] owing to the general reliance within the economy on a con-
tinuously expanding supply of credit and money from the banking system. This reduction in lending triggers
intervention by the central banks to stimulate the economy by dropping interest rates. Since however the sys-
tem is supply rather than demand constrained, this hinders the ability of banks to increase their capital and
absorb loan losses, leading to a further reduction in economic activity.17 Eventually the banking system begins
to once again expand lending, as loan defaults are Vnally absorbed, and the central bank shortly thereafter, fol-
lowing accepted economic theory, reacts by raising interest rates to prevent the economy overheating. In the
short term this again has the opposite eUect to that desired, as higher interest rates increase bank income18, al-
lowing increased capital expansion and lending19, and the central bank in its turn raises interest rates higher.
Eventually this triggers a new credit crisis either through the build up of liquidity imbalances caused by long
term interest rate Wows, or by causing excessive loan defaults as borrowers are unable to meet their interest
repayments. Since the early 1980’s this series of events would also have been exacerbated by the widespread
use of loan securitization, which we can infer from the experiment involving cross bank lending, would act to
further unbalance liquidity Wows within the banking system and place increased stress on the asset side of the
system.
Whatever may be thought of this particlar argument, the larger problem remains. How do we determine if or
when, this or any other explanation is correct? The banking system presents a complex set of transactions,
interacting within a dynamic economy. It is not the case after all that current economic theory is lacking plau-
sible explanations for observed phenomena, what is absent is any reliable mechanism for determining which
theory is correct, and given the long history of systemically eUecting changes to the banking system, when.
The approach outlined in this paper oUers a way out of this impasse. Threadneedle is not designed to simulate
any particular banking system, but rather to allow banking system simulations to be constructed. This allows
experimental banking systems to be constructed and used to isolate the behaviour of the diUerent components
of the system, accounting treatments, Vnancial instruments, or regulatory requirements. These results can then
be used as the basis for larger and more realistic economic simulations and models tailored to the regulatory
peculiarities of individual national banking systems.
More work is needed to develop the features available within Threadneedle, in particular a richer set of Vnan-
cial instruments is required, as well as central bank, commercial bank and borrower behaviours, and the inclu-
sion of international banking, foreign exchange and stock and commodity markets. This will require research
into determining the actual accounting mechanisms being used for these operations, and any regional or na-
tional diUerences that exist, but lies well within the scope of current computer technology.
Basing simulations on double entry book keeping operations also opens up the eventual possibility of linking
economic simulations. Double entry book keeping provides a common set of Vnancial operations identical to
those used in the actual Vnancial system, and as a consequence also provides a common reference point that
can be used to link simulations together. This opens up the possibility of detailed simulation of the economy
at the national and international level by multiple teams. It should be acknowledged though that constructing
large complex simulations of poorly understood systems, however accurate they may be, is not necessarily a
step forward. They are likely to be just as diXcult to analyze as their real life counterparts. We suspect that the
real power of systems like Threadneedle will be to allow small systems to be constructed that are tractable to
analysis, and teaching, which can then be extended to larger systems, as a more strongly founded understand-
ing of banking and its interaction with the economy is progressively established.
17This may be partially oUset if lower interest rates act to reduce loan defaults by lowering the repayment burden on the borrower.
18Nominally, bank income is interest rate neutral since banks also pay interest on their savings accounts. However not all accounts
attract interest, and banks also have more leeway to increase spreads in a high interest rate period than a low one. It could be argued this
is an example of the zero bound inWuencing the system, but again in an opposite direction to that generally believed.
19The Icelandic banking system in the 2005-7 years presents an extreme example of this with some highly questionable methods being
used to increase capital.
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